Force XXI. The context for the battle was the Army's Advanced Warfighting Experiment (AWE) for digitization and other future capabilities.
During the day and night prior, the Brigade capitalized on its sophisticated intelligence capabilities to discern exactly where the enemy was preparing its array of tactical obstacles.
Through digitized terrain analysis the Brigade's leaders gained appreciation of the important tactical characteristics of the terrain. Yet on that morning, the Brigade's attack faltered as they approached and then, with difficulty, breached the obstacle.
As the obstacles were finally reduced, the enemy employed remotely delivered scatterable mines, using multiple rocket launcher assets, to reinforce the breached obstacles in depth and deal a defeating blow to the brigade's offensive momentum. The obstacles the Brigade had encountered, exactly where anticipated, were in some locations nothing more than wire fence obstacles, in other locations surface laid anti-tank mines.
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This episode from the AWE underscores a trend that has been seen at our combat training centers for years--that an enemy's direct attack of our capability to maneuver significantly impacts the battle and that we continue to have difficulty in successfully overcoming maneuver countermeasures. Looking to the years past 2010 and even past bringing Force XXI to fruition, the Army After Next effort "seeks to provide the Army of 2 02 0 with the physical speed and agility to complement the mental agility inherited from Force XXI." 3 As pioneers of the AAN effort have begun to explore the characteristics and likely requirements of future battle, they have concluded, "mobility, characterized predominantly by speed of maneuver, proved to be the most important factor contributing to battlefield success." 4 AAN is headed toward a substantial development and fielding effort to generate significant improvements in mobility for the Army's future force. At the same time however, we recognize that "any serious military threat between now and the 2025 period will very likely involve asymmetric forces designed specifically to threaten U.S. superiority in areas requiring long development and deployment lead times."
5
Is countermobility an area in which adversaries will focus and negate potential U.S. maneuver superiority?
With any concerted efforts to build a future force of knowledge and speed, countermobility will remain a significant operational capability that we must address and that we will need to integrate for successful operations of the Army After Next. This paper will examine AAN operations and address why countermobility will be significant to those operations and how this battlefield function should be addressed integrally with the technological, physical, and doctrinal developments that will forge the Army's ability to rapidly maneuver and to strike with precision.
To conduct this analysis, I will first examine the concept of countermobility as a component of our doctrine, then look at the current directions for how AAN operations will be conducted, focusing on how we intend to regain maneuver dominance. With this basis, I will examine the potential impacts that countermobility may play in AAN operations, extending current countermobility capabilities and considering enhanced capabilities that appear to be feasible within collateral development times. Lastly, I will draw conclusions with regard to the significance of countermobility on our future operations, force structure, and development efforts.
COUNTERMOBILITY AS A DOCTRINAL CONCEPT
In 1985, the Army published a field manual entitled Countermobility.
Although not yet rescinded, the manual is outdated and largely ignored with current and better doctrine articulated in other publications. These tactical obstacles are comprised of minefields as well as other than mine obstacles. In terms of impacting the dynamics of combat power, countermobility efforts contribute to decision in engagements and battles by degrading the enemy's maneuver, thereby contributing to more favorable conditions for engagement with fires.
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Corps doctrine similarly defines countermobility as "those actions that impede movement of the opposing forces," and explains that such effort "can enhance the effectiveness of friendly fires and can cause the enemy losses in personnel, equipment, and time." Countermobility is accomplished by either physically or psychologically affecting the enemy force so that its ability to maneuver is impeded even more than the difficulties posed by the existing media of the battlespace. Techniques and procedures for countermobility efforts currently (and historically) fall into three classes of efforts--(1) physical alteration of existing battlespace to cause greater difficulty for movement, e.g., digging of an anti-tank ditch, blowing or digging of a road crater, digging a pit along an infantry approach, demolition of a bridge; (2) construction of barriers to impede movement, e.g., log obstacles, abatis, dragon's teeth, boulders, walls, wire obstacles; and (3) mine warfare. The first two categories render additional physical impediment to maneuver, with the last rendering psychological impediment to maneuver. Mine warfare combines the factors of lethality and uncertainty to cause minefields to be effective obstacles as they psychologically impact on maneuver of forces in their proximity.
While "the art of successfully using obstacles against enemy attack is as old as warfare," the concept and role of countermobility in our current doctrine follows a direct lineage to the start of this century and the First World War. Mine improvements will likely continue at a rapid pace. Inexpensive, land mines can destroy multi-million dollar weapon systems. The future outlook is even more ominous, with the evolution of new smart mines. Microelectronics will soon take mines to new levels of lethality. The countermine shortfall is particularly worrisome because it strikes at the heart of the Army's doctrine of rapid movement and surprise to win quick decisive victories." But, a specific definition or distinction of operational concepts is yet to be articulated.
THE DIRECTION OF AAN--A QUEST FOR ENHANCED MANEUVER
The base premise for the Army After Next effort is that the Army, as the nation's core land combat force, must develop the forces capable of dominant maneuver as well as precision engagement. The Army After Next must be able to:
"conduct battle rapidly and to end it cleanly at the moment when the paralytic effect of firepower is greatest...(forcing) psychological collapse--the breaking of an enemy's will to resist--(which) results when an opponent finds himself challenged and blocked wherever he turns."
20
The underlying assumptions are that "the object of war is not to kill the enemy so much as it is to break his will to resist," that decisive victory in war must be achieved by forces on the ground, and that firepower alone is limited in effect. 21 While precision capabilities have enhanced destructiveness of firepower, enemy forces have always and will always take measures to maximize their protection and survivability and continue to fight. Firepower alone cannot be counted on to defeat the will of an enemy nation or force. Firepower alone cannot guarantee establishment of military conditions needed to support national strategic objectives. The capability to maneuver is essential for decisive victory.
The Army After Next effort is seeking avenues by which the Army can attain physical agility to capitalize on mental agility.
Enhanced situational awareness, a capability that the Army will gain in moving toward the digitized Army XXI, will allow commanders to maneuver forces more rapidly and effectively. In moving toward AAN, the Army also will develop the physical ability in terms of organization, equipment, leaders, and soldiers, for future land combat units to move with speed that will allow exploiting enhanced and superior situational awareness.
In AAN war games conducted during 1997, forces were envisioned with the capability of conducting "an air-ground tactical method of maneuver that combined lighter surface fighting vehicles with advanced airframes capable of transporting them at speeds as great as 200 kilometers per hour over distances in excess of 1500 kilometers...terrain came to serve a protective and concealing function without restricting mobility." The speed for operational maneuver will necessitate the Army's shift "upward from its traditional two-dimensional spatial orientation of land forces into the vertical or third dimension." 22 The specific capabilities of this future force have been detailed in forces assumed for war games. AAN has stipulated objective criteria to which developers have already developed technologically constrained concept designs. Knowledge and Speed's air-ground concept has been conceptually embodied in a mix of ground vehicles transported in or under advanced aifframes giving a capability for rapid operational and tactical maneuver.
The force also has a family of aerial vehicles, all unmanned and operating at different altitudes and varying durations onstation, for purposes of reconnaissance and surveillance, air defense, fire support (precision engagement), and C4I support. The advanced airframe (AAF), a fixed wing tilt rotor craft with a 2 0 00 km range and speed up to 560 kph, provides transport for the AFV (one or two per airframe) and the ARES (up to four per airframe). More than just a lift airframe, the AAF with its weaponry and ability to take on an attack pod is also an airframe for attack. Linked to the technological capabilities enabling air-ground mobility at significantly higher speeds and ranges, the AAN effort has produced operational concepts or patterns for how these mobility capabilities will be employed. Out of the Winter War Games of 1997 came concepts for conduct of dispersed tactical operations, enabled by enhanced mobility and knowledge. Effects will be massed as opposed to forces. Prior to the AMT 97 Winter Games, similar concepts for future warfighting were already envisioned within the discussions of the OSD/DCSOPS sponsored Dominating Maneuver Workshop IV r held in Spring, 1996. One example envisioned at this workshop, the "swarm" concept, includes small and dispersed units massing briefly and suddenly in synchronized and decisive combat action against the enemy.
The concept included three forces with distinct roles, "pick a path (Eagle), make a path (Tiger), and exploit a path (Cobra)." Elements of a "swarm" force would execute key tasks to include emplacement of "dynamic" obstacles and breaching. 24 While the "swarm" concept may be the extreme for dispersion of force, the general trend through the body of all concepts examined at that workshop, and the trend within AAN thought, has been toward dispersed operations. Dispersion and speed of movement are seen as essential for force protection and retention of the force's potential to "pulse" against the enemy with precision and simultaneity.
THE SIGNIFICANCE OF COUNTERMOBILITY FOR AAN--WHY AND HOW
"Future land units will exploit terrain by maneuvering for tactical advantage within the folds and undulations of the earth's surface without suffering the restrictions imposed on mobility by contact with the ground. " 25 Statements such as that above might be taken to imply that technological advancements will allow the Army's future forces to maneuver without concern for natural obstacles or for efforts of an adversary to shape the existing battlespace in order to fight on more favorable terms. However, as noted in the previous section, efforts to conceptually design a force structure for the Army After Next have included consideration of both a countermobility capability within that force and a countercountermobility capability, or mobility capability, for overcoming obstacle efforts of the enemy. -Mine detection and neutralization systems will not only have to be effective but also durable and lightweight.
-Capable systems will have to be employable at speeds that will not degrade battle force maneuver unacceptably for the design operational concept -Energy sources of feasible weight, power, and longevity will have to be available for any directed energy technologies, particularly for use in mine neutralization.
By virtue of being wheeled, the AFV will be more susceptible than a tracked vehicle to effects of non-lethal obstacles such as craters, ditches, and rubble. Adding a blade to a 15-ton wheeled vehicle will give it little capability for clearing emplaced, excavated, or blasted obstacles. The laws of physics dictate that a substantial amount of work (force x distance) is needed to clear such obstacles back to trafficable conditions. Explosives technologies have and will offer techniques for reduction of physical obstacles but concerns remain. These issues include timeliness of employment, signature of employment, and reliability of results. Alternatively, materials technologies may offer potential for filling or building up obstructed terrain to become passable. But, no technology development effort in this direction is past infancy at best.
In summary for the ground piece of the air-ground maneuver concept, potential adversaries will have capabilities of yesterday and today to emplace obstacles in the path of an AFV force. If they should have the opportunity, then countermobility will have significant impact. While physical obstacle technology has not changed greatly since World War II, this is now a focus of new research. 27 The ground element of this air-ground force may maneuver rapidly between obstacles but, at an obstacle, maneuver may be delayed or stopped unless significant advancements are forthcoming in the arena of mobility support.
As noted earlier, this would require more than just keeping pace with mine advancements but an effort to first catch-up, then keep-up.
The advanced airframe (AAF) would give AAN battle forces the capability to move over the ground and any emplaced obstacles.
Other concepts have been considered, such as within the technology workshops of the AAN Winter War Games, for over-theground vehicles as future fighting platforms of the "land" force, relieving the Army of "suffering" for the ground-bound mobility of the AFV. 28 However, while such maneuver would take a considerable technological development, obstacle and mine responses to counter the maneuver capability are just as technologically feasible.
Precursors of such countermeasures have already appeared.
The idea of using terrain for its protective effects while maneuvering over it to avoid its restrictions does little to Stepping back from the specific issue of ground or air mobility for fighting vehicles, the operational concepts for future dominant maneuver by land forces should cause concern for countermobility responses. While dispersion and smaller units linked by enhanced situational awareness would appear to yield a warfighting pattern that would be less vulnerable to obstacle operations, increased capacity for situational obstacles on the part of our adversaries would still be a distinct threat. For example, if the enemy could discern the patterns of a "swarm" operation, employment of a capability for situational obstacles at the location that the "Tiger" team finds a "path" would hold significant potential for interference with the "Cobra" team's exploitation maneuver.
Should AAN operations move beyond AAF/AFV air-ground maneuver and shift further into over-ground maneuver, the countermobility experience of the Navy may take on new relevance for the Army. The Army's current concepts with regards to countermobility are centered on obstacles and anti-vehicular mine employment against a mechanized force, concepts dating back primarily to World War II. However, the Navy, with its maneuver through the comparatively featureless medium of the world's oceans, has been struggling with a concept of mine warfare for at least a hundred more years. Disregarding restrictions such as straits, naval mining is effective in areas where naval forces need to project to impact battle space around land-based objectives, targets, or ports. Mines are effective sea obstacles at the periphery of the featureless medium. Employment of future maneuver countermeasures in the airspace may be similar.
Obstacles would still be effective where the medium for maneuver becomes constrained--again, at the periphery of the medium--above the ground on which targets and objectives are located. Viewed within the construct of current Army doctrine for countermobility, such employment of future obstacles or mines fits the concept of protective obstacles, helping to counter the maneuver of assaulting forces in order to retain a position, protect the force, and continue mission support.
With consideration of service approaches to countermine and mobility support, it is interesting to note that there is a widely held perspective in both services that disregards or diminishes the capability to attack our maneuver. The Navy has traditionally neglected mine warfare and has recently been playing catch-up with their countermine capability. 35 Similarly, a tendency to overlook such capabilities also exists within the Army. Knowledge and Speed reflects such thought, giving concern to natural obstacles but not to reinforcing obstacles. Breaking the Phalanx, a recent proposal for new combined arms formations at lower echelon of command includes engineer mobility structure within the combined arms battalion but fails to address staff integration at the group level. Colonel MacGregor portrays heavy combat group operations as largely immune to obstacles except for when they "pick their way through." Although the capacity of mine obstacles to thwart attacks and counterattacks is clearly noted, the ramifications of this finding for an offensively focused Army are not examined within a context of superior application of the dynamics of combat power. 37 The significance of countermobility in AAN operations lies not only in the fact that future obstacles or mines may degrade force mobility, causing decisive delays in maneuver, but also because the survivability of the force is dependent on its ability to move rapidly. Force protection is risked by giving up traditional forms of protection such as armor plating, in order to gain in the complementary dynamic of combat power, maneuver.
Once slowed the force is very vulnerable. By the air-ground concept of Knowledge and Speed, if the force has to "bypass" obstacles by moving out of the protective folds of terrain, folds that also identify potential axes of advance to-the opposing commander who has analyzed his battlespace, the force becomes more vulnerable. Countermobility efforts will be an understandably attractive area of focus for a force preparing to do combat with the Army After Next.
The capability of our forces to execute countermobility will also be a significant combat multiplier for success in battle.
While we seek to increase significantly the mobility of the force, the measure of how fast is fast enough must be gauged relative to an adversary's capability to maneuver and to engage with fires. Our integration of countermobility will continue to offer battlefield effects to gain this relative increase, not just compared to our capabilities today but relative to an enemy's capability tomorrow. With the speed of movement and offensive focus envisioned for AAN operations, the AAN battle force would be well served to have a truly "dynamic" obstacle capability.
Although the concept of "dynamic" obstacles has not yet been defined formally, the Army appears to be headed toward an extension of the concept of situational obstacles to a capability not only for near-instantaneous emplacement, but also for command activation/inactivation so that the lethality of a minefield becomes controllable. The capabilities of the previously cited "advanced brilliant mines" are not detailed in the AAN report, but the term itself implies an extension of the Intelligent Minefield (IMF) concept, an effort started in FY93 as an ATD programmed through FYOO. 38 This enhancement in control of minefield lethality will indeed offer obstacle capabilities that will be "dynamic" on the battlefield in terms of space and time.
In support of precision engagement, the capability to employ In these instances, the capability to execute countermobility against enemy forces that may assault the battle force position would still be important. Additionally, protective obstacle capabilities will be needed for any support assets, even if located very remotely from area of battle force operations, for fixed position activities.
CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
By this examination of AAN directions along with trends of countermobility capabilities and concepts, it is apparent that countermobility will continue to be a significant factor in the future. Our Army must be able to overcome an adversary's employment of such techniques against us in order to achieve the desired ascendancy of maneuver. With this significance, there are several implications for our efforts in moving toward the Army After Next.
First, the Army must pursue continued research and development in the arena of mobility/countermobility hand in hand with efforts to develop a force with physical agility. Lagging mobility support capabilities identified earlier cannot be ignored if we are to attain the desired mobility enhancements.
As the force's capability to maneuver will still be subject to attack, capability to execute breach operations will still be required, though that breach will differ from that attempted on 29 March by Task Force XXI. Rapid obstacle reduction will be an essential fundamental of such breaching operations, enabled by precursor abilities to acquire and analyze the obstacle.
In order to equip such a highly mobile force with obstacle reduction capability, we will obviously have to move beyond the dependence on the heavy mechanical reduction implements that we currently have and are scheduled to be fielding through the first decade of the next century. Army is to capitalize on the products of our ATDs and ACTDs. The growing complexity of threats to maneuver will dictate that the Army After Next have forces and leaders dedicated to maneuver support, understanding the complexities of the threat, and fully appreciating the capabilities and employment of an array of capabilities that will be necessary to minimize an adversary's effectiveness in degrading our maneuver. The Navy is headed in a similar direction with its Mine Warfare Command and surface and aviation force structure focused on countermine actions.
The requirement for a combat support function of maneuver support would suggest that our current force structures and doctrines for combat engineer functions, chemical reconnaissance, smoke generation, and battlefield circulation control may need to be relooked and refined to a more responsive support concept and force structure. MacGregor's question concerning how to comprise and command combined arms formations is very much at issue here.
We have made mistakes in this arena before by trying to build mobility capabilities directly into our armored forces. However, the effectiveness of these capabilities was limited by the finite span of attention of those concerned with closing with and killing the enemy. Structuring armored vehicle launched bridges and mine plows and rollers into the tank battalions are both examples of capabilities not utilized to full effectiveness due to poor organization. And, if the potentials of third dimension maneuver and countermobility are realized, our maneuver support forces will have to be structured to overcome these threats in all dimensions. Lastly, our AAN will require countermobility capabilities fitted to our operational concepts and effective against an array of enemy capabilities. The U.S. has been a technological leader in mine warfare and with current ATDs such as Intelligent Minefield should continue to be for sometime. However, in moving to the Army After Next, there are some concerns for our countermobility development efforts. First, the U.S. capabilities for remote emplacement are lagging. As addressed earlier, remote emplacement, with rapidity of emplacement, is an underpinning of the concept of situational obstacles. Rotary and fixed wing air platforms are vulnerable during minefield emplacement. And, with mission planning and preparation times, these systems are less rapid than they may seem at first glance.
The U.S. should seriously examine rocket emplacement capability, a direction that countries of the former Soviet block have extensively developed. 42 The second concern would be that our countermobility capability becomes overly simple, losing the factor of uncertainty that enables minefields to be effective obstacles.
Investment in one or two very capable systems such as WAM and Volcano can carry a disadvantage of simplifying an adversary's countermine efforts. While scatterable mines offer a significant capability in that they are rapidly emplaceable and very lethal, there are potential drawbacks in the fact that they are also surface laid and, therefore, more easily acquired and vulnerable to countermeasures. Putting all of our countermobility capability into one or two high technology systems at the cost of a greater palette of capabilities, may not serve the Army well over the full spectrum of operations that we will conduct.
Perhaps the significant contribution that new technology contributes is greater diversity and complexity in the range of capabilities as well as the new capability itself.
Also, in developing our future capabilities for countermobility, we should not lose sight of the potential for low technology countermeasures to high technology munitions, to include mines. Even today as we invest significant amounts of money into high technology munitions such as WAM, we must not forget potential simple responses to such high-tech munitions, such as being incapacitated by dismounted infantry. The complementary overlaps of combined arms and high/low technology mixes will continue to be important for full spectrum dominance.
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